In the last decade bottom-up approaches to legal development cooperation have become increasingly popular. Examples are reform ideas and programmes using concepts such as 'access to justice' and 'legal empowerment.' Th ese approaches share a common concern that legal interventions should benefi t the poor, and that their needs and preferences should form the basis for legal reforms. Proponents argue that these approaches are important alternatives to ineff ective pre-existing legal reform practices which were based on 'the rule of law orthodoxy.' Th is paper critically discusses the content, context and merits of such bottom-up approaches. It concludes that while these approaches off er advantages, they should not substitute but complement pre-existing legal development cooperation practices and the rule of law paradigm on which they are based. Th e emergence of these new approaches shows how much legal development cooperation is a fi eld of trends, where doubts about their eff ectiveness force legal reformers to regularly shift from one paradigm to the next, enthusiastically applauding the seemingly new, while sacrifi cing the caricaturized old.
Introduction
In the early 1990s, law regained an important role in the fi eld of development cooperation. International donor organizations strongly expanded programmes to strengthen legislation and legal institutions in developing countries. Th ey did so in order to promote economic growth, good governance and human rights protection. Over the years, the concept of the rule of law has been an overarching paradigm that gave normative direction to projects and project prioritization, and 1 In the last decade, legal development cooperation gradually moved in a diff erent direction, as a new bundle of ideas developed, best summarized as bottom-up approaches to legal development cooperation, which focused on the end-users of justice systems, rather than on the institutions that make up such systems. Th ese ideas contain concepts such as 'access to justice', 'legal empowerment', and recently some scholars have even coined the term 'microjustice'. 2 Th ese approaches share a common concern that legal interventions should directly or specifi cally benefi t the poor, rather than trickling down to possibly help them through systemic, institutional reforms and that their needs and preferences should form the basis for interventions. To some extent the approaches are presented as new and alternative, and better than existing practices and the existing legal development paradigm which have jointly been labelled as 'the rule of law orthodoxy.'
3 Th e new approaches have been developed simultaneously by donor organizations and a small group of scholars, sometimes working for the donors. Infl uential donors include the UNDP, the World Bank, the Commission for Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP), the Ford Foundation, the UK Department for International Development (DfID), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In the last decade of scholarship on international legal interventions there has been some study of these approaches. 4 However, until recently such studies were often carried out by scholars who sought to promote them as alternatives to existing programmes Benjamin van Rooij HJRL 4 (2012) and by donor organizations which themselves engaged in projects based on their ideas. While these ideas are slowly gaining ground, we still lack a comprehensive and objective view of their merits and challenges. Th is paper seeks to off er such a view. First of all, it does so by studying the content of bottom-up approaches, looking at how they are defi ned and how they analyze the problems they seek to solve, as well as at the measures they propagate to reach such solutions. Here, the paper is limited to two types of documents: (1) programme overviews by the main donors involved, and (2) studies outlining general approaches by scholars. Second, this paper addresses why these approaches have emerged over the last decade, analyzing changes in development approaches, studying the critiques of preceding legal interventions and looking at the criticisms of the existing rule of law paradigm. Th ird, the paper analyzes the merits of bottom-up approaches. It does so by fi rst analyzing the eff ects of bottom-up approaches on increasing access to justice and legal empowerment. It does so, secondly, by providing a more general analysis as to whether these approaches are new and alternative, and whether they off er a solution to the problems identifi ed in the existing rule of law paradigm and legal development cooperation practices. Th is paper will argue that the bottom-up approaches, while not new, are an important addition to existing practices and may solve some of the diagnosed problems. However, many problems with the new approaches remain, while new challenges will develop. In addition, the approaches do not provide a good alternative for the rule of law framework, lacking its inherent normative function and comprehensiveness. Th e conclusion of this paper will look at the wider implications of the trend shift towards bottom-up approaches, discussing the challenges that trend-oriented thinking brings for successful legal development cooperation.
What Are Bottom-up Approaches?
Th e bottom-up approaches have become known mainly under two names: 'Access to Justice' 5 and 'Legal Empowerment'. 6 While there is a great deal of overlap, 5 Th ere is a clear distinction in legal empowerment approaches that seek broadly to empower the poor through the use of law (as propagated by Golub, the Ford Foundation and ADB) and approaches that use the term legal empowerment to cover work carried out on formalizing the informal property rights of the poor (as propagated by De Soto, CLEP, the World Bank and USAID). Th e latter approaches to legal empowerment will be discussed in the next section on legal pluralism and non-state justice. 6 Another name is Justice for the Poor adopted by the World Bank, which is also a bottom-up approach. See <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/ of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404512000176 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UVA Universiteit van Amsterdam, on 09 Jan 2020 at 19:13:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms Bringing Justice to the Poor, Bottom-up Legal Development Cooperation depending on the exact approach, the diff erence between the two is mainly that the former considers access to justice itself to be the main goal, and the latter considers the empowerment of the weak and the poor to be the main goal, seeing lack of power as the basic problem underlying poverty. Th ere is no clear boundary between the two, however, as legal empowerment may involve access to justice and access to justice may involve legal empowerment. 7 
Defi nitions
Although there is a great deal of overlap in what the bottom-up approaches seek to accomplish and how they seek to do so, there are several diff erent strands. A fi rst example is UNDP's access to justice approach which UNDP summarizes as 'supporting justice and related systems so that they work for those who are poor and disadvantaged. ' 8 UNDP writes that 'access to justice is a basic human right as well as an indispensable means to combat poverty, prevent and resolve confl icts.' Th e UNDP approach to access to justice explicitly recognizes that justice systems can be found both in the formal state institutions, as well as in informal non-state normative systems. A similar type of bottom-up approach is the World Bank's 'Justice for the Poor' programme. In its background document the Bank writes Justice for the Poor is an attempt by the World Bank to grapple with some of the theoretical and practical challenges of promoting justice sector reform in a number of countries in Africa and East Asia. Justice for the Poor refl ects an understanding of the need for demand oriented, community driven approach to justice and governance reform, which values the perspectives of the users, particularly the poor and marginalized as women, youth, and ethnic minorities.
9
A second category of bottom-up approaches uses the name 'legal empowerment' or 'legal empowerment of the poor.' Under this notion, two broad categories of approaches can be discerned. Th e fi rst category of legal empowerment approaches was introduced by donors including the Ford Foundation and the Asian Development Bank, and described primarily by Golub. Here 'legal empowerment is the use of legal services, often in combination with related development activities, HJRL 4 (2012) to increase disadvantaged populations' control over their lives.' 10 Golub further writes that 'it is both an alternative to the problematic, state-centric rule-of-law orthodoxy and a means for making rights-based development a reality using law to support broader socioeconomic development initiatives.' 11 In 2010, Golub concisely defi ned legal empowerment as 'the use of law to specifi cally strengthen the disadvantaged.' 12 He explains that 'the use of law' does not merely refer to legislation and court decisions but a broad spectrum of laws, regulations, contracts and customary or religious justice systems; 'specifi cally' expresses the focus on the disadvantaged; 'strengthen' is the empowerment feature, which he sees as 'increasing people control over their lives'; while 'disadvantaged' includes the poor generally, but also specifi c marginalized groups or individuals 'affl icted by discrimination or other injustices.'
13 In a report for USAID, John Bruce et al. similarly write that
Legal empowerment of the poor occurs when the poor, their supporters, or governments -employing legal and other means -create rights, capacities, and/or opportunities for the poor that give them new power to use law and legal tools to escape poverty and marginalization. Empowerment is a process, an end in itself, and a means of escaping poverty.
14 Th e second category of legal empowerment approaches is based on ideas of the Peruvian economist De Soto who argues that most property and businesses of the poor cannot be capitalized as they are regulated in informal (non-state) normative systems and are excluded from participation in larger markets that require formal (state) recognition. 15 In response to his work, the High Commission for Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) was founded which aims to 'enable the poor to use law and the legal system to realize their full human potential.' 16 While the CLEP approach to legal empowerment shares much with the UNDP and World Bank approaches to access to justice and also shares many traits of Golub's legal empowerment alternative, it has a diff erent focus. CLEP's work mainly uses enhanced access to justice and legal empowerment to attain the capitalization of the poor's property rights and thus focuses mainly on the formalization of informal enterprises and land tenure arrangements. Bringing Justice to the Poor, Bottom-up Legal Development Cooperation
Common goals and problem analyses
Bottom-up approaches are said to be closely connected to poverty reduction efforts. UNDP for example states that Access to justice is a vital part of the UNDP mandate to reduce poverty and strengthen democratic governance. Within the broad context of justice reform, UNDP's specifi c niche lies in supporting justice and related systems so that they work for those who are poor and disadvantaged. 18 Anderson similarly holds that especially the poor have limited access to legal institutions and that a state of 'lawlessness' adversely infl uences the poor. 19 Furthermore, Golub and the ADB argue that legal empowerment has helped advance poverty alleviation.
20
Bottom-up approaches share a common analysis of the obstacles that the poor meet when seeking justice or of what legal obstacles there are in keeping the poor out of power. Th ey do so by looking at the state legal system, and sometimes also at other non-state normative systems. Diff erent studies have provided diff erent analyses, however with one large overlap. When combined and structured, the main obstacles that the poor face when seeking justice or empowerment through legal means can largely be organized in two groups: (1) problems/obstacles related to the justice supply side (including norms and institutions, both formal and informal), and (2) problems/obstacles related to the poor justice seeker him/herself.
Proponents of bottom-up approaches blame justice suppliers for failing to benefi t the poor. It all starts with the norms which are thought to have an antipoor bias, in content as well as in their alien, formal and complex form. A well known example of this is De Soto's thesis that state law fails to recognize the informal property rights of the poor. 21 Problems in the norms are exacerbated by justice institutions which suff er from a similar anti-poor bias 22 and a lack of independence from elites.
23 Th e poor face an even more daunting task, bottom-up proponents hold, because of the slowness of legal procedures, 24 the costs of legal process, 25 a lack of adequate information provision of legal norms and legal practice, and the geographical distance to the courts. 26 Widespread corruption and abuse of power combined with a limited accountability of the legal profession and professional monitoring are other important negative factors. 27 Proponents of bottom-up approaches furthermore stress that the poor have problems in fi nding eff ective remedies against injustice due to a lack of eff ective enforcement of judgments. 28 Th ey further fi nd that the poor have diffi culty in using justice institutions because of a lack of legal aid systems or the availability of aff ordable legal representation to take up their cases, 29 as well as the limited development of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems.
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Bottom-up proponents also blame the poor's particular characteristics for undermining their ability to make eff ective use of justice institutions. Th ey fi nd, for example, that the poor's lack of fi nancial capacity and experience in dealing with formal justice institutions obstructs success in seeking legal redress. 31 A related obstacle is the poor's limited legal awareness and knowledge of the law and their rights.
32 ADB in its discussion of legal empowerment work in Asia further fi nds that economic dependency obstructs the poor and the weak in enforcing their rights and seeking access against dominant employers, husbands or landlords. In addition, poor people are believed to distrust formal institutions and the law; often such distrust coincides with the perception that achieving justice through the legal system is diffi cult or impossible.
35 Th e poor are further inhibited in seeking redress for injustices in formal institutions due to the fact that many live in illegality in terms of housing, tax payment or registration and a fear of going to a formal court, or are barred from doing so in the fi rst place.
36

Common solutions
Bottom-up approaches call for sets of reforms and interventions to improve access to justice or the (legal) empowerment of the poor. While there are diff erences, there is also quite some overlap in the actual measures that are proposed under the bottom-up approaches. Generally, bottom-up approaches incorporate eff orts directed at enhancing legal awareness , especially through providing education and training in rights awareness, and through improving legal aid to the poor. Th is includes legal aid clinics and legal assistance by public interest lawyers and paralegals. Th is stimulates the development alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and supports local existing dispute resolution institutions. It also strengthens civil society in general and helps communities to obtain stronger organization.
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Most bottom-up approaches advocate a participatory manner of work in performing the discussed legal awareness and legal aid improvement eff orts. 38 In addition, several authors call for 'mainstreaming' legal sector activities into other sectors of development work, both in recipient countries as well as in donor institutions. Bottom-up approaches further recognize the importance of non-state traditional normative and justice systems and argue for supporting these institutions as they are closer to the weak and the poor. 40 Another principle recognized in several studies is that bottom-up approaches require time and that tight project cycles and an overly large portfolio of programmes should be avoided. 41 Furthermore, most studies agree that work should be based less on existing models that are simply transplanted, and instead work with tailor-made solutions that are as close to local realities as possible. 42 Finally, studies pay attention to fi nding suffi cient support for reforms to overcome cooptation by vested interests and powerful elites. 43 
Normative standards
In their portrayal of these problems and of the direction that the solutions should be aimed at, bottom-up approaches apply varying normative standards, which are to be used for setting priorities in projects and evaluating outcomes. An example of diff erent approaches can be found when comparing Golub with UNDP and Anderson. Th e access to justice studies by UNDP and Anderson take a list of basic human rights standards as their main normative framework. UNDP writes that the problems that are addressed should always be situated in a human rights context, 'in order to determine a basis of accountability that people can claim and other actors should strive to comply with.' 44 Golub's legal empowerment approach, however, is fi rst and foremost based on the needs of the poor and on how they themselves prioritize such needs. Such needs and priorities therefore seem to be the normative basis in his work. Human rights play a role in such needs and priorities, as he states that 'the realization of empowerment, freedom, and poverty alleviation typically equals enforcement of various human rights.' 45 Golub states, however, that while legal empowerment can be seen as a rights-based approach to development, it is more than that, as it is 'about power even more than about law,' 46 and may, apart from rights training and poor people's legal capacity build- 47 In bottom-up approaches, international human rights standards can thus play an important role. A question which one can ask is whether such a preset normative basis that largely originates from Western-inspired treaties matches the bottom-up characterized approaches which are being advocated and whether human rights and poverty relief truly match in practice.
Th e role of the state
One main diff ering variable in the measures proposed in the bottom-up approaches 48 is whether state institutions should be targeted. Many bottom-up approaches seek to establish comprehensive reforms which incorporate both state and non-state community and civil society institutions. 49 As such, while advocating reforms directed at supporting NGOs and community-based initiatives, studies by the UNDP, Anderson, and the ADB also seek judicial independence and court reform, by making legislation more 'pro-poor' and training law enforcement offi cials in human rights. Golub's 'legal empowerment alternative', in contrast, largely advocates funding civil society. Golub writes, Th e most successful and creative legal services for the poor across the globe generally are carried out by NGOs, often in partnership with community organizations, or occasionally by law school programmes that eff ectively function as NGOs.
Why Are Bottom-up Approaches Emerging?
Th e rise of bottom-up approaches should be understood within the context of wide-ranging developments in the fi eld of international development cooperation, the role of law in those developments, and the way that legal interventions have been commented upon in recent years. Access to justice, legal empowerment and micro-justice are in many ways reactions against trends and practices of the past or the result of recent trend changes.
Th e concept of development: towards social development, individual development and broad poverty reduction
A fi rst important reason for the popularity of bottom-up approaches lies in the changes in the concept of 'development' in the last decades. Development has moved from economics to wider-ranging aspects of development. First, development was evaluated in terms of economic growth and income distribution. Since the 1970s, with the basic needs approach, and since the 1980s, with the human development approach, development is regarded as a more comprehensive concept than being based on economic growth or income equality alone. 52 Gasper writes, 'Th e human development approach stresses the lack of adequate connection between levels of monetized activity and levels of well-being, and frequently unreliable or perverse links to well-being from economic growth.' 53 Even the World Bank, which was a solid economic growth perspective proponent, has incorporated social concerns in its development approach with the adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework in 1999. 54 With this broader perspective, development became increasingly complex and progressively contained complementary but sometimes also contrasting goals.
A second change in the development perspective came with the move from macro-level nationwide thinking to thinking about development in terms of subnational groups or individuals. 55 macro-level oriented and was based on the idea that national economic growth can trickle down to all, including the poor. In contrast with this macro-level orientation of development, micro-level grassroots approaches emerged since the 1970s. Th e basic needs approach, which started in the 1970s, takes the poor as its fundamental starting point and defi nes development as addressing their needs. In 1976, the ILO, for example, outlined such needs in terms of personal consumption (food, shelter, and clothing), access to essential services (clean water, sanitation, education, transport and healthcare), access to paid employment, and qualitative needs (a healthy and safe environment, the ability to participate in decisionmaking). 56 Another approach that works bottom-up has been the rights-based or the human rights-based approach to development, in which development is framed in terms of the rights of the poor. 57 Sen's development as freedom, to name another example of a bottom-up (framed) approach to development, sees development as 'a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy,' thus also basing his approach on the individual.
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A change that encompasses both the broader non-economic approach to development as well as the bottom-up conceptualization is that development has increasingly become understood in terms of poverty eradication; and poverty is less understood to solely encompass a lack of income, but also includes physical vulnerability and powerlessness within existing political and social structures. Bottom-up approaches to legal development cooperation originate from within this switch from macro-economic growth to micro-level relief of the needs of the poor. Th ey resonate well with the latest development policy documents and help donors to argue why money should be spent on law in the fi rst place: to help the poor (at the bottom), as legal interventions are tailored to their needs.
Critique of the rule of law concept as an overarching paradigm for legal reform
A second reason why bottom-up approaches such as access to justice and legal empowerment have become increasingly infl uential is that they off er an alternative paradigm, now that the existing overarching paradigm behind legal interventions, the rule of law, is increasingly being criticized. Scholars have been critical of the emergence of the concept of the rule of law or the way it was operationalized within the fi eld of law and development. Kennedy argues that the concept's inherent broadness, vagueness and its assumed neutrality made it suitable to circumvent 56 60 He is critical as he fi nds that the rule of law -because of its inherent broadness, vagueness and assumed neutrality -off ers policymakers 'a domain of expertise, a program of action, which obscures the need for distributional choices or for clarity about how distributing this one way rather than another will in fact lead to development.' 61 In his view the rule of law has been a way to work on development, now that there is no clear agreement on how such development can be achieved.
62 Donors, he argues, rather maintain a vague and general concept of the rule of law to avoid diffi cult sensitive and practical questions when cooperating with recipient offi cials.
Other scholars agree with Kennedy, fi nding that donors have purposefully kept the operationalization of the rule of law in specifi c projects limited. 63 Bergling summarizes views expressed by other scholars 64 that such vagueness may make the rule of law 'conceptually overburdened when it is invoked for too many potentially opposed reasons.'
65 Th e concept's vagueness and its inherent many meanings and diff erent ends may result in some goals, such as promoting certainty and establishing law and order, being opposed to the protection of human rights. Th us, he fi nds that promoting a rule of law aimed at economic development may sustain authoritarian regimes without enhancing the protection of human rights. 66 Kleinfeld has further argued that the way the concept of the rule of law has been operationalized in terms of reforms directed at certain institutions has undermined the broader reforms necessary to achieve the ends that the rule of law should achieve. Another line of critique stresses that legal reform is based on a false model originating from an ideal situation that also does not exist in the West. 68 Finally, there is much criticism arguing that legal reforms based on a rule of law concept will be inherently top-down, state-centred, fostering legal elites, carrying a false pretense of political neutrality, creating more formalism and bureaucracy and questioning the impact that such rule of law programmes can have on poverty and enhancing development whichever way they are framed. 69 Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, bottom-up approaches, such as access to justice and legal empowerment, are attempts to constitute alternatives for the fl awed rule of law paradigm.
Critique of legal development cooperation practices
Closely connected to the critique about the concept of the rule of law, there has been much criticism about the legal intervention practices that were pursued under its name. Th e bottom-up approaches are framed as attempts to deal with such critique.
A fi rst, general point of critique is that legal development cooperation practice has been ineff ective in creating development, especially if development is seen as supporting the poor and the weak. 70 Further, many scholars fi nd that legal development projects suff er from a lack of knowledge, emphasizing that legal reform can only work if it is based on suffi cient knowledge of what law can do for development and how it could do so. 71 Several authors fi rst of all believe that it is diffi cult to prove that law can aid development. 72 Here the ambiguity of fi ndings about the causality of law and economic development 73 and of the rule of law and democracy 74 is interesting. 75 It should be noted that establishing causal relations between law and development or law and democratization is diffi cult, as is measuring such causal eff ects. 76 Second, others, still believing in the law's possible contribution to development, argue that more data are necessary about exactly what kind of legal reform leads to development. Carothers and Channell for instance hold that the processes of how legal change is accomplished and what it does for development are not well/ suffi ciently understood. 77 Garth holds that practice has inadequately used social science techniques and insights as a basis for legal reform. 78 Similarly, Seidman et al. hold that successful substantive law reform (legislation reforms) should be based on thorough social scientifi c research about the behaviour of the various norm addressees involved. 79 Tamanaha has warned, however, that in many developmental contexts, such research capacity may be limited and that getting policymakers and lawmakers to engage in research may prove to be unfeasible.
A third point of critique concerns the top-down character of law reform projects, which means that local contexts are not suffi ciently considered or incorporated. 80 Faundez writes that 'despite agreement on this point in practice, an analysis of the local context is rarely carried out.' 81 He fi nds that this happens because Western experts tend to take the context for granted in their own jurisdiction. 82 Similarly, Dick states that foreign experts 'being confi dent of their expertise and good intentions, they are under no pressure to interrogate their own political and legal culture or to investigate in any depth that of the host country.' 83 A combination of a lack of knowledge and top-down policy and implementation may lead to unforeseen results, 84 sometimes even opposed to the original aims and actually weakening local contexts, 85 authors warn. In international projects, such top-down operation methods further run the danger of ethnocentricity. 86 A fourth point of critique is that legal reform has been too state-centred and has focused on the courts and lawmaking processes. 87 As a result, scholars such as Golub, for example, hold that legal implementation and enforcement can be even more important than legal reform per se; that legal empowerment off ers crucially important paths toward eff ecting legal implementation; and that without such paths reforms will not reach the poor, and will thus do little to enhance their lives, and may even strengthen existing bureaucratic elites. 88 State-centred approaches furthermore lack eff ectiveness in contexts where non-state normative systems are important and where legal reform should address issues of legal pluralism. 89 Meanwhile, other scholars fi nd that the state is not well positioned to help the poor and that more attention should be given to civil society. 90 One reason for the top-down character of legal reform programmes is the necessity for some donors such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to cooperate initially with their 'natural counterparts': central governments in the targeted countries. 91 Fifth, scholars further warn that legal development cooperation practice is insuffi ciently aware of its inherent political nature and is politically naive. Part of this critique concerns the assumption that legal reform is merely 'technical assistance.' 92 Dick notes that 'the fundamental issue in reform is not the consistency of law but how the state with all its ramifi cations exercises its immense powers and in whose interests [it does so].' He concludes that 'the key to reform is therefore not law but politics.' 93 Dezelay and Garth note that law is at the core of power and that this fact is central in analyzing the function of law in society. 94 Reforming law, even if it is only the law's mere technicalities, is thus a matter of reforming power. Th erefore, they state that 'law cannot be considered merely a technology to be acquired off the shelf as the best or most effi cient practice.' 95 Similar to Dezelay and Garth, several scholars believe that law in fact is very close to power, and that law reform is infl uenced by diff erent stakeholders contesting for power. Legal reform may thus strengthen the position of authoritarian elites, or be successfully opposed by them if it is against their interests. 96 In addition, Hammergren fi nds that the general disinterest or resistance of the general public may be an even more formidable obstacle to successful legal reform. 97 Such facts are not always recognized in law and development practice, some scholars hold. 98 In close relation to this, Golub summarizes a range of studies concluding that in certain contexts of vested interests, of a lack of political will to reform as well as of widespread corruption, reform eff orts directed at state institutions have proved to be fruitless. 99 Similarly, studies have found that when there is a lack of demand for law reform amongst elites, such reform is likely to fail to deliver its goals, and instead other reforms that will help create such demand should be supported. 100 Sixth, some authors believe that legal development projects have made great promises that they cannot fulfi l. Given the immense complexities that social engineering through law entails 101 and the inherent limitations in terms of resources, knowledge and support, the expectations about what can be achieved through legal reform should be tempered, such scholars fi nd. Here the speed at which change is expected is crucial. Several authors hold that legal reform can only be successful if given suffi cient time, 102 and therefore they warn against haste and impatience.
103 However, the problem with time is that most law and development projects run on project cycles of a short period.
Seventh, scholars further fi nd that legal development cooperation projects suffer from internal problems related to the donor's bureaucracy. 104 Th ey fi nd that donor pressure to spend money, the use of best practices, the infl uence of a common sense appeal, preferences for accountability and measurability and certain incentive structures, combined with the inherent complexity of improving the rule of law in diff erent types of settings have led to weak project preparation, a limited use of existing knowledge and research, goal displacement seeking accountability instead of eff ect, weak evaluations, and thus ultimately weak information about what works and what does not and thus a continuation of defi cient types of projects.
Suffi ce it to say that scholarship presents a bleak view of legal development cooperation practice: It (a) lacks knowledge, (b) is out of touch with local reality, (c) does not understand the power relations it is embedded in, and (d) fails to reach the poor it aims to help. Th e bottom-up approaches off er hope amidst the summarized critiques, by giving alternatives for fl awed and obsolete interventions, so it seems.
The Effects of Bottom-up Approaches
One of the bottom-up proponents' core critiques of the preceding rule of law state-centred justice interventions was their lack of eff ectiveness, especially for the poor and the weak. So, how have bottom-up approach projects fared in terms of enhancing access to justice and legal empowerment? Luckily, there has recently been quite some study and evaluation of the impact of bottom-up projects. Unfortunately, it is of varying quality and presents mixed results.
Evaluations and studies have, at face value, identifi ed a number of positive impacts from bottom-up projects. An early study by the ADB shows that bottomup interventions improved legal knowledge, economic well-being, gender equality, land tenure security, and participation. 105 A study by a former USAID executive on a USAID-sponsored community court programme in Bolivia fi nds an increase in legal awareness and success in 'addressing the legal needs of marginalized populations.' 106 A study carried out by senior programme staff and consultants of three projects funded by the World Bank Justice for the Poor programme, shows that the development of so-called 'peace communities' in northern Kenya have become a popular and successful way to 'defi ne ground rules between diff erent local [justice] systems.' 107 It further shows some successful accomplishments/ achievements, especially given the diffi cult local political context in which labour arbitration courts need to operate, while steadily having increased their case load and managing 'to fi nd for the most part workable resolutions minimally acceptable to all parties.' 108 A collection of studies organized by the IIED and the FAO similarly shows the positive results of typical bottom-up interventions such as an increased number of paralegals, the improvement of legal literacy as well as providing public interest litigation, legal clinics, and rights information centres. 109 Th ey Bringing Justice to the Poor, Bottom-up Legal Development Cooperation fi nd that these interventions have improved land tenure under customary settings. 110 A UNDP-commissioned assessment of legal empowerment, which was aimed to be improved through a community radio project, shows that 'the project heightened awareness of rights and helped reduce tolerance of injustice,' and concludes that 'this experimental project has been a success, worthy of replication and importantly, of continuing support, with a possible view of incorporation into the UNDP agenda.' 111 Maru, who co-founded and co-directed a World Bank-paid paralegal programme in Sierra Leone, discusses the Bank's Justice for the Poor programmes and fi nds a positive impact of both legal aid and paralegal projects, fi nding 'impressive rates of case resolution', 'a startling success' (both in Ecuador), 112 'respondents were overwhelmingly positive [about their experiences with the paralegals],' praising 'eff ectiveness [of the paralegals] in resolving diffi cult disputes,' and 'strong evidence that Timap's [the funded paralegal organization] were indeed empowering their clients, the paralegals themselves, and the community as a whole to claim their rights and pursue cases that had previously stagnated' (both in Sierra Leone). 113 Another example is a UNDP-commissioned study about worldwide Customary Justice interventions such as legal awareness training through literacy courses, information groups, education campaigns, the publication of guidebooks on state and non-state laws and travelling street theatre. It fi nds that these methods have helped improve the position of vulnerable groups and provide entry points for human rights in Bangladesh, Malawi, East Timor, Indonesia and Cambodia. 114 It further states that legal aid was improved through paralegals, lawyers' networks, dispute clearing houses, dispute resolution panels and ADR training in Sierra Leone, Th ailand, East Timor, Puerto Rico and Cambodia. It also found that the capacity development of informal justice actors, working in the realm of customary and non-state law, by means of providing mediation services and improving citizens' rights, worked reasonably well in Burundi, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Rwanda and Bangladesh. Some of the reports also summarize the limits and challenges. Th e IIED/FAOcommissioned papers about legal empowerment are very frank about the challenges. Th ey stress that interventions are restrained by a number of factors including a lack of capacity amongst paralegals, 115 resistant local elites who fear an undermining of their power base, 116 donor dependency and a lack of sustainability, 117 a lack of confi dence and trust by the (local) community, 118 and 'cut-throat antagonism' between weak and poor communities and powerful outside investors.
119 Th e World Bank study on its own Justice for the Poor interventions notes challenges in terms of limited representatives in the newly established local organizations.
120 Th e UNDP-commissioned study on customary justice notes the challenges, including the diffi culty to train lay persons as paralegals, a prevalence of ceremony over capacity, gender quotas for adjudicators which can undermine community cohesion, and the fact that disputing parties sometimes remain dissatisfi ed with the emphasis on reconciliation during the process. Moreover, the strengthening of informal dispute mechanisms perpetuates the absence of formal institutions, and newly-built capacity appears to lack sustainability and local legitimacy. 121 Commissioned by the IDLO, a study by Knight shows that while paralegals have had a positive eff ect on community land titling programmes, overall community progress hinged much more on broader local socio-political factors including the perceived external threat to local tenure security, leader ca- 115 122 Maru, discussing the World Bank Justice for the Poor programme that also funded his former paralegal organization, fi nds challenges especially in terms of making support work at a larger scale and making such support sustainable once donors end their contribution. He further warns that maintaining independence from the government is diffi cult. 123 Popovic, in his evaluation report for the UNDP Cambodian access to justice programme, fi nds that only two out of four outputs were initiated, and that it required much more time than expected and sustainability could not be ascertained. 124 Moreover, he states that the reported positive impact 'remains limited as the communes/districts covered by the project are few in relation to the national territory.' 125 Meanwhile at the conceptual level, the concept of legal empowerment as operationalized by CLEP came in for fi erce criticism: over-ambitiousness, inconsistencies in the conceptual framework of legal empowerment, an excessive focus on De Soto's theories about legal exclusion, a failure to incorporate other legal and non-legal factors responsible for injustice and poverty, inadequate attention to gender issues, a top-down approach even while bottom-up is preached, and insuffi cient attention to the inherent political and power issues at play. 126 In reading the reports and studies on the bottom-up interventions one obtains a mixed picture, which in most reports inclines to the positive side. Can we therefore conclude that these projects do have the intended impact? And can we even say that they have succeed where the rule of law approach has failed? Before we can do so, there are a few issues that require some discussion.
Th e fi rst issue is the defi nition of impact. Most of the studies discussed here have looked at the immediate impact on particular problems found in the local communities where the project was carried out. A fi rst question is whether the separately observed impacts (of the various reports) jointly combine into the broader impact sought by the paradigms in terms of empowerment, access to justice, minority rights protection, and broader capital integration. Moreover, one can ask questions about the scale and sustainability of the impact. Most projects studied are of a relatively smaller scale, of a pilot-like nature, and it is often assumed that observed positive impacts could serve as a model for a broader intervention. It is not clear whether the projects would have worked in the fi rst place without signifi cant support from a major donor, and a clear focus in a certain locality. Neither is it clear whether the success can be sustained without the donor's involvement, or that it can be transplanted, through a best-practice type approach. Finally, we could defi ne impact not just in terms of the achieved results, but also in terms of the manner in which the results were achieved. While bottom-up approaches stress interventions based on local knowledge, variation, and needs, the usage of terms such as 'programme guides', 'best practices' and 'entry points', evidences an attempt to guide and steer and thus to unify what should have been locally-driven approaches. Just as the top-down approaches have a problem in trickling down, bottom-up approaches have a problem in scaling upwards and the main donors, in order to manage larger funds and create broader impact, have to revert to top-down management practices, but now applied to localized practices.
Th e second issue is the method of measuring impact and the portrayal of success and failure into conclusions. Few of the studies provide a detailed report of their research methods, 127 and whether surveys or other methods were used or which types of data were gathered to discuss outputs and impact. Most studies are framed as a description of the context of the project and its aims, and as a discussion of its results and challenges and, only occasionally, of its failures. Th is framing almost automatically leads to a positive portrayal of the intervention, which is (thereupon) regarded as the best way to solve the problem at hand. A good example is the IDLO-commissioned study by Harper, 128 which provides one of the broadest overviews of how to improve customary justice systems, mostly through bottom-up interventions. While this study does list the challenges in the possible interventions, it ends each section only with an overview of 'entry points' and 'good practices', and generally 129 not with a clear summary of what should or should not be done under particular circumstances. 130 Measuring the impact of the bottom-up and customary justice interventions is highly challenging, as it requires establishing a causal link between the various interventions on the one 127 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404512000176 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UVA Universiteit van Amsterdam, on 09 Jan 2020 at 19:13:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms hand, and the various desired and complex outcomes (empowerment, legal awareness, human rights protection, etc.) on the other. As Khair writes It is indeed diffi cult to establish a causal link between specifi c legal actions and the resultant legal actions and the resultant development. One of the fundamental problems in assessing legal empowerment is that the characteristics and conduct that typify empowerment in one context may well have diff erent implications in another. 131 Only the IDLO-commissioned study by Knight provides a more scientifi c and balanced approach to measuring impact, with a clear methodology and a comparison of groups with diff erent levels of intervention. 132 Some of the other studies portray initiatives as success, simply by describing outputs, 133 or (even worse) by simply restating the aims that they seek to address. 134 Th ere are also studies that end by concluding and explaining a certain success, even though there is a clear indication within the study that success was only limited and that a more toneddown conclusion is warranted. 135 Few studies, with the exception of Knight's study, 136 provide a detailed and systematic analysis of which conditions explain the outcomes, both positive and negative. Finally, and perhaps most worrisome, is that most impact studies discussed here were carried out by people who were directly responsible for the conceptualization, funding, or execution of the project. While these studies are of course carried out in a manner that is intended to be as objective as possible, a conceivable positive bias may nonetheless creep in. As Channell writes in the context of the rule of law paradigm, or failures. Where they exist, implementers know how to describe them as success. 137 It seems that in order to fully ascertain the presented data (and obtain better/superior objective project evaluations), more study by independent scholars is necessary.
Are Bottom-up Approaches Good Alternatives?
While bottom-up approaches seem to off er an alternative to the existing rule of law programmes, the question is how good the bottom-up approaches are as alternatives to the existing rule of law paradigm and legal reform practices. Th is leads to three questions. First, are the approaches truly new and diff erent? Second, do the bottom-up approaches form a valid and workable alternative for the existing normative and comprehensive rule of law paradigm-based approaches for legal interventions? Th ird, do bottom-up approaches eff ectively deal with the problems of past and existing approaches to legal interventions, which the bottom-up proponents so much criticize?
Bottom-up approaches are not as innovative as presented
Th e answer to the fi rst question as to whether the approaches are new can be short: not really. Many of the reform measures that have been propagated in the legal empowerment and access to justice approaches seem to have had a longer history. While some may present such approaches as alternatives, 138 implying that they are new, in fact they are not. Law and development practice aiming to improve access to justice and supporting legal aid, legal awareness programmes, and court reform aimed at better access have been developed at least since the 1970s. 139 Internationally operating donor foundations such as the Ford Foundation and Novib have played an important role by strengthening access to justice and working on legal empowerment since the 1970s, while national governments in developing countries have themselves also looked at ways of how to strengthen access to their justice institutions. 140 In addition, Blake states that in reaction to the critiques of the Law and Development Movement in the 1970s, an alternative 'micro paradigm to law and development practice' emerged, which sought to develop law and legal resources for the poorest of the poor. 141 He mentions organizations such as the International Center for Law in Development, the International Development Law Institute and the International Th ird World Legal Studies Association, as the main micro law and development proponents founded in the early 1980s. In addition, he discusses eff orts including operations concerning human rights, land reform, environmental and natural resources, legal literacy, legal services, gender law, labour law, consumer law, and housing and tenancy law, which were all carried out by organizations seeking to aid the poor. 142 Meanwhile, legal reform eff orts targeting civil society continued in the 1990s, such as, for example, by USAID's emphasis on working with NGOs in their Latin American legal reform projects under the Clinton administration. 143 Th e academic study of access to justice outside the fi eld of law and development also has a longer history. Especially the series of volumes under the general editorship of Cappelletti in 1978 and 1979 have been very important, both in terms of their conceptual analysis and comparative data collection, including some studies of non-Western countries. Especially noteworthy is Cappelletti and Garth's work, outlining the fi eld of access to justice at the time 144 based on a worldwide survey, 145 as well as Johnson's work, outlining strategies for enhancing access, 146 Friedman's study which provides a framework of diff erent access problems, the origins of such problems and possible solutions, 147 Trubek's article on advocacy, 148 Koch's piece with anthropological approaches 149 and fi nally Bush's article on access to justice in Africa and how to deal with pluralism. 150 Other important studies include: Galanter's work on the US, arguing that the poor have worse access to justice due to a lack of fi nancial means and litigation experience, 151 and Felstiner et al.'s conceptualization of access to justice elements, seeing them as a sequence of processes that enable justice seekers to fi nd remedies for grievances. 152 Present studies on access to justice and legal empowerment scantly refer to such existing work or to practice developed in the past. Of the older works, mainly Galanter and Felstiner et al.'s work is used to a certain extent, while the extensive and rich body of research under Cappelletti is largely ignored.
In sum, bottom-up approaches in general are not new. Work on strengthening legal aid, legal aid clinics and enhancing legal awareness has been carried out by international donors since the 1970s. Similarly, we see that at the national level, both state and non-state actors have developed similar programmes. It seems that the criticisms aimed at existing legal reform projects, as discussed in the previous section, have been based on a limited portrayal of existing practices and entail something of a caricature. Th is partly seems to be done in order to argue a strong move away from law and development practices directed at the state or in cooperation with state institutions.
A replacement for the rule of law paradigm?
A second question is whether the bottom-up approaches are good alternatives to the overarching rule of law paradigm. In other words, can we dispense with the rule of law and its fl aws of being state-centred, broad and vague? Some proponents of the legal empowerment 'alternative', especially Golub, would answer yes to this question. Th ey have played an important role in criticizing the rule of law-based legal reforms and have coined the term 'the rule of law orthodoxy' for it, arguing that legal empowerment is a good alternative for integrating law and development approaches. 153 However, the rule of law remains an important paradigm for legal reform programmes and it should not be replaced by the concepts of, or normative frameworks used in, the bottom-up approaches.
A fi rst problem which arises when discarding the rule of law concept is that of possible replacements off ering less comprehensive guidance to overall legal reform. Golub's legal empowerment approach, for instance, lacks the comprehensiveness of the rule of law, as it does not include work to be carried out on state actors, which ultimately do infl uence the laws and the higher echelons of the justice sector that form the fi nal justice guarantee if local dispute resolution mechanisms fail. While the access to justice approaches, especially those by UNDP, are much broader and do include a variety of state and non-state actors, they also lack essential elements which are covered by the rule of law concept. Th e rule of law concept covers a broad range of elements including legal equality, law and order, predictability and the protection of human rights. 154 Access to justice approaches, such as those framed by UNDP based on Felstiner et al.'s framework, fail to cover important issues including law and order, predictability and the prevention of grievances.
A second problem which arises when the rule of law concept is discarded is that the bottom-up paradigms may not provide the same normative guidance as the rule of law. It is most problematic that many bottom-up approaches fail to provide an overarching normative framework. Lacking such a framework, practitioners may face diffi cult questions about what can be considered a just outcome of the reforms and the targeted legal processes, or how to select groups for empowerment. In other words, how the preparation, execution and evaluation of legal reform projects are to be defi ned as successful or unsuccessful becomes a diffi cult question lacking an overarching framework for normative guidance.
Some bottom-up approaches discard the rule of law concept in favour of a normative human rights framework, referring to norms in international treaties.
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Using human rights as a normative basis and guidance for legal development cooperation off ers the advantage of using an extensive set of clearly defi ned standards that legal systems should meet. Disadvantaged groups can easily resort to such clearly defi ned rights, especially with their increasing international infl uence. 156 However, human rights off er a more restrictive framework for legal reform than the rule of law. First, the realization of human rights often requires a change in the legal system and its social and political contexts which many human rights approaches, because of their focus on international norms instead of local reforms, fail to articulate and stimulate. Th e rule of law concept off ers a better agenda of comprehensive reforms, as most of its conceptions, as used in international legal cooperation, cover the functioning and improvement of elements of the legal system within its social and political contexts. Moreover, the rule of law can include norms based on human rights, depending on the type of rule of law conception used. Second, human rights have a history of political use in international relations, while the rule of law has retained a more technical status.
157 Th e political nature of human rights-based approaches is one of their strengths as it can help create the necessary support for change. However, it is also their weakness, as it can make international legal development cooperation reforms which are based on these approaches easy targets for nationalist discourses claiming human rights imperialism and legal ethnocentrism. Th ird, prioritizing human rights has been diffi cult as such rights are deemed to be absolute and inviolable. 158 Important questions remain about what to do when the political will or resources are lacking to strive for full rights protection, or how to act when rights are confl icting and rights protection is a zero-sum game. 159 In addition, the prioritization of human rights in the international arena, if it is attempted, is done rather on the basis of international consensus about the defi nition of core rights than on the basis of what is most needed in order to achieve poverty eradication and human development. In comparison with human rights, the rule of law concept used in international legal development cooperation is more pragmatic as there has been constant thought about trade-off s between its elements, the prioritization and sequencing of related reforms, as well as its linkages with diff erent approaches to development. 160 
Bottom-up approaches face the same challenges as the older programmes which they criticize
Th e third issue that needs to be answered to evaluate the bottom-up approaches as an alternative for the rule of law paradigm is the question of to what extent the bottom-up approaches tackle the problems noted in earlier legal reform eff orts as portrayed in the literature. Th e proponents of bottom-up approaches have many important ideas. Th ey make the poor the central focus point, thus trying to bridge the gap between the poor's needs and what the law has to off er. Th ey are well aware of the political reality and the resistance that reforms may encounter and actually strive to change power relations. Upon closer study, it seems that even though the bottom-up approaches off er ameliorations, they still suff er from some of the old problems.
First, as discussed, even though positive eff ects have been reported, the data on which these reports are based cannot be considered suffi ciently independent and objective, and suff er from methodological challenges. Th us, while there is an indication that the new approaches have had positive results, the extent to which the bottom-up approaches help to aid the poor is not entirely certain. In order to achieve this kind of evaluation and overview, more time needs to elapse and more research needs to be carried out by academics not working as evaluators who are directly employed by donors.
Second, while there has been signifi cant critique of the lack of knowledge used in existing legal development practices, few have wondered what the knowledge base for bottom-up approaches actually comprises. Although a large body of studies exists on access to justice and legal empowerment, especially from the late 1970s, this work is scantly used in the design of new approaches, which as a result also rely on a weak knowledge base. Moreover, when existing knowledge and conceptualization is used, it is not always done so with good care. A good example of incoherent operationalization is the way in which UNDP has reframed Felstiner et al.'s access to justice model in which access is seen as the process from grievance to remedy, which includes fi ve elements, the last of which is the enforcement of judgments. Such enforcement thus indicates the execution of adjudicative decisions aimed to provide remedies for grievances. However, in its explanation of this last element of its access to justice model, UNDP interprets enforcement in a diff erent way, by discussing unjust practices as they may occur in criminal law enforcement. Th e UNDP access to justice framework thus confuses the execution of judgments as an element from grievance to remedy, as originally operationalized by Felstiner et al., with preventing injustice in criminal law enforcement. 161 Th ird, bottom-up approaches still contain some top-down elements: such as the human rights normative basis, the resulting focus (at least by the UNDP) on criminal justice projects that do not seem to originate from preferences of the (rural) poor, a blueprint model of types of reform measures to be taken, even though there is awareness of local variations, and the set belief that NGOs represent the poor especially in the approach favoured by Golub, while many may be based in national capitals and may speak for the poor rather than truly represent them. 162 Jensen has argued that true representation is a fi ction, as he states that 'those who should reasonably be considered stakeholders are simply too numerous.'
163 While involving NGOs is important, and to some extent already done in existing programmes, it remains questionable whether bottom-up approaches can truly give the poor a voice in legal reform as the approaches seek to do.
Fourth, bottom-up approaches are indeed less state-centred and less biased merely on court reform than the criticized older forms of law reforms. However, there is a danger that by over-focusing on civil society, as Golub especially does, necessary elements in the state institutions may be neglected.
Fifth, bottom-up approaches, in contrast to the criticised forms of legal development approaches, do pay attention to existing power structures and the political nature of domestic legal reform in international legal development cooperation, and to some extent aim to change such power structures. Sixth, the bottom-up approaches may also suff er from over-ambitiousness just as programmes did in the past. When reading the studies and policy documents, the aims of these programmes are far-reaching: alleviation of poverty, eradication of injustice and protection of human rights, while changing existing power structures, not only locally but also nationally. Such ambitions could easily lead to disappointment, just as happened with former legal reforms. Awareness is expressed in the documents that the proposed changes take time. However, whether specifi cally taken measures are actually given such time largely depends on the bureaucratic framework of the donor institution, which seems unchanged. Moreover, a close reading of the existing studies about impact, as presented above, shows that, so far, results are mixed at best and that the high level of ambition can easily lead to disappointment, just as it did following the rule of law paradigm.
Finally, this brings us to the seventh point of the critique of former approaches: the bureaucratic obstacles within donor organizations and how these perpetuate failure. Th ere is no indication that with the new approaches the fundamental functioning of donor organizations has changed. Th ey remain driven for success, if possible, easily measurable and detectable within limited timeframes, depending on a limited group of consultants and operating with a restricted view of existing knowledge and caring more about repetition than innovation. 164 
Conclusion
Bottom-up approaches to legal development cooperation are important and necessary. Th ey directly focus on the poor and the weak and address how vested powers can obstruct the interests of disenfranchised people. Th ey off er ways to direct legal reform programmes outside of the legal box and combine them with political measures such as advocacy, organization and participation. Also when compared to the preceding rule of law paradigm, the new approaches at least show some impact and success in achieving their highly challenging goals of empowering the disadvantaged and improving justice for the poor. Access to justice and legal empowerment are essential; however, they are not magic bullets. Th ey still face some of the same structural obstacles as earlier legal development cooperation approaches. Moreover, bottom-up approaches can only achieve their full potential if they are combined with proper broader institutional reforms and are aligned with a neutral and comprehensive normative framework. Th erefore, recognizing the many merits of these approaches, this paper warns that it would be a mistake to view bottom-up approaches as substitutes for or alternatives to the current rule of law paradigm, as it would be a mistake to see top-down institutional reforms as a sole approach to enhance justice and development for the disadvantaged. Bottom-up approaches should be seen as additional methods and be carried out alongside existing practices instead of fully replacing them. Th ey should also be seen as an integrated critique of institution-oriented legal development cooperation practice that serves to improve the many failings of the top-down oriented rule of law approaches and hopefully develop into an integrated top-down and bottomup strategy that combines both. Here our fi ndings are similar to an earlier study on 'the micro-paradigm to law and development' by Blake, arguing that while 'micro-theory is a constructive, hopeful path for the disadvantaged […] microdevelopment is not a panacea: many problems cannot be eff ectively addressed by grassroots techniques alone.' 165 Even Golub, who has been strongly critical of the existing rule of law paradigm and the state-centred approaches to legal development cooperation, and who is a major proponent of the 'legal empowerment alternative,' admits in one of his papers the need to combine such approaches with existing rule of law-based work on state institutions -albeit only under certain circumstances. 166 Law and development is a fi eld of strong trends. Over the decades it has moved back and forth, from the blossoming of the Law and Development movement in the 1960s to its criticism and downfall in the 1970s, to micro-approaches to law and development in the early 1980s, to law's importance for markets in the early 1990s, to the rule of law becoming a development goal in the late 1990s, to the bottom-up approaches that have gained importance since 2000. Law and development is a fi eld of trends just as development is. One constant factor in both fi elds is a critical attitude to the past and present, combined with great hope for trends propagated for the future. Th e emergence of bottom-up approaches in the last decade is a good example. On the one hand, these approaches have developed amidst growing critique of existing programmes. On the other hand, the new approaches themselves are presented with great hope emphasizing their merits with little recognition of their possible limits. A possible explanation for the seeming contradiction between critique and hope is that the hope created by trend shifts off ers possibilities to reinvigorate public support for programmes that are inherently challenging and open to criticism. Trend shifts are therefore an integral part of the fi eld of law and development. However, scholars should be careful not to be overly drawn into such trends and should continue to off er data that help inform policy makers to make the right choices to improve existing programmes. In order to do so, more research on the eff ects of projects carried out under the bottom-up approaches is required, and especially research carried out by independent scholars not doing so in the context of donor-commissioned evaluations, and neither for the purpose of seeking to promote new paradigms.
